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Mass Disaster Mediation: Innovative
ADR, or a Lion's Den?
Elizabeth Baker Murrill'
Imagine the following scene. An insurance company representative
who has years of experience evaluating claims and negotiating claims is
sitting across the table from a nice, elderly lady from the Lower Ninth Ward
in New Orleans.2 According to neighbors who stayed until the water rose,
her roof was torn off of her house by wind before taking on 23 feet of water.
It was a complete loss. Her insurance company is denying coverage due to
the water damage - the classic wind or water coverage dispute. She has no
education beyond high school and knows nothing about mediation or formal
negotiations, but various people suggested she might be able to settle her
claims with her insurance company if she came to this meeting. She is
currently living alone in a FEMA trailer park because she has lost
everything, including her spouse who died of a heart attack several months
after the storm. She is in limbo regarding her future. Her ability to act
depends on obtaining money to rebuild her life.
The insurance claims representative, meanwhile, is skilled in the field of
negotiations and knows immediately upon meeting her that this lady is naYve
in the mediation and negotiations process and the law, desperate for money,
and trusts her insurance company to take care of her. Additionally, as a
veteran of many claims negotiations, the insurance representative knows that
the law largely allows many kinds of misleading comments to be made
during negotiations.3
What do you think the outcome is? The main premise of this article is
that this naively unaware lady just walked into the proverbial Lion's Den.
1. Elizabeth Baker Murrill is an Assistant Professor of Professional Practice at Louisiana
State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, and a mediator. She is currently on leave while
working at the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C., as a United States Supreme Court
Judicial Fellow.
2. This is a fictional anecdote based on a hybrid of real individuals' cases. The author
volunteers in a legal aid clinic at a FEMA trailer park where many residents fit this description.
3. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219
(1991); James White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiations, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESOL. J. 926 (1980).
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Mass torts and other mass claims are becoming an ever more popular
forum for the use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve parties' claims
in the wake of events that produce thousands of conflicts overnight.4
Mediation, in particular, has been used in several high-profile mass disaster
events in an effort to resolve individual claims efficiently and quickly.5 This
paper evaluates special risks posed in this kind of mediation that can go to
the heart and the integrity of the mediation process. The thesis of this paper
is that the potential imbalance in the parties' experience, education, and
individual situation can contribute to a power imbalance which creates the
risk of coercion and lack of informed consent. Moreover, external factors,
like politics, culture, and the economy can affect how power is distributed at
the bargaining table.6 Factors that are internal to the victims of the disaster
can affect an individual's cognitive functioning after being involved in a
mass disaster, potentially affecting consent to an agreement.7
The way to resolve those problems may be to think more carefully about
the process design so that safeguards are in place that will protect process
integrity, decrease the imbalance of power between bargaining parties, and
increase mediator awareness of special risks posed by mass disaster
4. See Cindy Fazzi, Disaster: When It Strikes, ADR Can Come to the Rescue in Resolving
Mass Tort Claims, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 16 (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4281.
The American Arbitration Association has created a separate section to administer mass mediation
programs. See www.adr.org (last visited April 11, 2007).
5. Among the disasters are the Northridge Earthquake, and Hurricanes Andrew, Iniki,
Katrina, and Rita. These programs are discussed in detail throughout this paper.
6. P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
(1979). Social science researchers state that negotiating power is based on the possession of tangible
and intangible resources, as well as macrosocietal conditions such as prevailing ideologies and
norms. See generally MORTON DEUTCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973).
7. Some academic commentary has addressed the issue of informed consent in the general
mediation context. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decision Making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999) [hereinafter
Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation]; NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, MEDIATION:
LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE §2:02 (2d ed. 1994) (recognizing informed consent as an aspect of the
fairness debate in mediation); Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study
of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Baruch-
Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice]. Baruch-Bush identifies nine specific dilemmas
mediators can encounter in an ordinary mediation context: keeping within the limits of competency,
preserving impartiality, maintaining confidentiality, ensuring informed consent, preserving self-
determination/maintaining non-directiveness, separating mediation from counseling and legal
advice, avoiding party exposure to harm as a result of mediation, preventing party abuse of the
mediation process, and handling conflicts of interest. Baruch-Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation
Practice, at 9. As is discussed further in this paper, all of these risks can take on greater proportions
in the context of a mass mediation program following a disaster. See infra text and accompanying
notes, especially sources cited in note 70.
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situations.' Such changes would increase the usefulness of mediation in this
context.
This article first discusses several mass disaster mediation programs: the
programs for hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, the Northridge Earthquake
Mediation Program, and currently active programs administrated by
American Arbitration Association for insurance disputes arising from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in Louisiana and Hurricane Katrina in
Mississippi.9 The second part discusses external pressures, such as political,
cultural, and economic factors, which create the external context for a mass
mediation program."' The third part discusses psychological responses,
cognitive processing, and the impact a mass disaster can have on an
individual's ability to process information and make educated, sound
decisions, which create an internal context in any particular mediation."
The fourth part discusses implications and recommendations for both system
designers and for mediators. 2
The conclusion of this article is that mass insurance mediation programs
can provide property owners with a quicker, more efficient way to resolve
their insurance claims and move on with their lives. But they can also carry
other consequences. Sponsors of such programs must ask whether any such
system has been designed to foster competent decision making, whether it is
inherently more favorable to insurers, and whether the program creates an
environment that serves only to take advantage of people who already have
been victimized and may be desperate and vulnerable. Mass mediation
programs are a new and innovative form of mediation on the horizon, but it
is time we gave more thought to the context in which they are used and the
8. PAUL WEHR, Limiting Conflict: The Gandhian Style, in CONFLICT REGULATION 26, 37-38
(1997). This is ultimately consistent with an "empowerment model" of conflict regulation, which
recognizes balance of power is desirable to prevent unrestrained behavior by the more powerful or
desperation in the weaker party, a model discussed by Wehr.
One of the propositions of this article is that process design for mass mediation needs a
metacognitive approach. "Metacognition is thinking about the kind of thinking that a task requires."
Kip Smith, James Shanteau, & Paul Johnson, Introduction. What Does It Mean to be Competent? in
DECISION MAKING 1, 2 (2004).
9. See infra Part 1.
10. See infra Part 11. See also John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices
Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839 (1997) (examining internal and external factors
affecting the quality of consent in a general mediation context).
11. See infra Part Ill.
12. See infra Part IV.
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protections that need to be in place to effectively contribute to recovery from
the disaster.
THE EXPANSION OF MASS DISASTER MEDIATION
Mass mediation programs have been popping up in the aftermath of
natural disasters primarily to deal with hundreds of thousands of insurance
property claims. Those claims usually have individual dimensions and
shared commonalities - each person's damages are different, but coverage
issues may be shared by thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of people. 3
The prospect of litigation, then, poses a very real problem of conflicting
rulings on coverage and a long process of fighting those issues for years
through appeal courts. 1
4
Facing this situation, the American Arbitration Association blazed the
early path into mass disaster mediation with a claims resolution program
launched after Hurricane Andrew hit southern Florida on August 24, 1992,
leaving 30 people dead and 250,000 homeless. Damage was estimated to be
$30 billion. ' 5 At the time, Hurricane Andrew was one of the worst natural
disasters to hit the United States and it generated about 25,000 insurance-
related claims.' 6  The AAA program was established at the request of
Florida's Department of Insurance due to the massive number of pending
claims. 17 The program processed some 2,400 claims, 92% of which were
settled within one year. "
This ADR experience has been promoted as and has become a template
for programs in other states. This model has been used to settle claims
arising out of damage caused by Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii and the 1994
13. Jonathan R.T. Davidson & Alexander C. McFarlane, The Extent and Impact of Mental
Health Problems After Disaster, 67 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 9, 11 (2006) [hereinafter Davidson &
McFarlane, Extent and Impact]. A "disaster" can be distinguished from other types of traumatic
events by its scale and widespread impact. According to Davidson & McFarlane, "disasters have in
common a collective social suffering that requires a supreme effort by individuals, communities and
even entire societies to overcome." Disasters are events with predictable long-term consequences.
Id.
14. The litigation process, of course, takes a great deal more time. Parties have procedurally
mandated time periods within which to answer pleadings and conduct discovery before a trial is
held. Parties may file writs of certiorari on particular rulings, and ultimately can appeal any final
judgment. The insurance litigation in Mississippi and Louisiana demonstrates how time-consuming,
expensive, and complicated the litigation process can be in the wake of disaster.
15. Fazzi, supra note 4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See AAA Brochure, www.adr.com (last visited March 22, 2007); Mississippi Insurance
Department, www.doi.state.ms.us (last visited March 22, 2007); Louisiana Department of Insurance.
http://www.ldi.la.gov/ (last visited March 22, 2007); see also Fazzi, supra note 4.
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California Northridge earthquake.' 9  Its success spawned permanent
insurance mediation programs in New York, Florida, and California. ° From
the perspective of the Florida Department of Insurance, the program was a
"resounding success" and prevented a great deal of litigation.2 '
On Sept. 11, 1992, less than a month after Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane
Iniki hit Hawaii, leaving 3 dead and causing an estimated $1.6 billion in
damage. 22  Facing a situation similar to Florida, the State of Hawaii
responded by establishing a mediation program jointly with the state's
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs and the state's Center for
Alternative Dispute Resolution. 3 AAA handled numerous claims filed by
victims.2 4  Under the Hurricane Iniki program, town meetings were held
throughout Kauai to address concerns of the victims and to educate them
about the mediation program. 5
In 1995, AAA handled a voluntary ADR program for the California
Department of Insurance to resolve insurance claims arising from the 1994
Northridge earthquake, which damaged or destroyed hundreds of thousands
of homes.26 Unlike the initial programs arising from Andrew and Iniki, the
Northridge mediation program offered more choices: dispute evaluation and
assessment, mediation, binding arbitration, and non-binding arbitration. 7
In 1998, AAA, in cooperation with the University of North Dakota's
Conflict Resolution Center, set up a program for the victims of a flood in
Grand Forks, N.D., caused when several dikes failed and left the city under
water.28 The flood triggered a fire downtown, which affected most of the
50,000 residents of Grand Forks. 29 AAA, the Conflict Resolution Center,
and the Red River Valley Community Action Center jointly introduced a
grassroots ADR program to handle family and landlord-tenant claims, buy-
19. Fazzi, supra note 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 18.
22. Id. See also Hurricane Iniki Ranked 3d Costliest Disaster in U.S., THE MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 25, 1992 (estimating that the hurricane would produce about 50,000 insurance claims).
23. Fazzi, supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Press Release, American Arbitration Association, AAA Responds to Gulf Coast Tragedy
With New Program to Manage Dispute Resolution Following Disasters (Oct. 7, 2005),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26856 [hereinafter AAA Responds].
27. Fazzi, supra note 4.
28. Id.; see also AAA Responds, supra note 26.
29. Id.; AAA Responds, supra note 26.
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out disputes with claims under $10,000, construction, insurance, financial
and mortgage cases, and buy-out cases with claims exceeding $10,000.30
Civic organizations contacted and educated flood victims about their ADR
options. "
AAA has also participated in other mass claim ADR initiatives,
including using ADR to streamline bankruptcy litigation, settlement of
claims arising out of the Greyhound Lines Inc.'s reorganization in 1990, tort
claims filed against the St. Johnsbury Trucking Company in 1993, the R.H.
Macy reorganization in 1995, and the Pine Top liquidation program. 32 AAA
is working with major insurance companies such as New York Life and
General American Life to resolve individual policyholder claims. 33
There is need and value in these programs, which offer alternatives to
litigation that allow people who are victims of disasters to move on with
their lives. In theory, these programs also allow victims some control over
process and outcome, which can contribute to their psychological
recovery.34  But not all of these programs are the same. Some have a
significant educational component and many have mediator training and
claims evaluation components.35 Protective legislation in some states allows
insureds a "cooling-off' period away from the negotiations during which
they can confirm they made the right decision. 36 Florida now permanently
provides funding and a structure for mediation for indigents.37 As discussed
below, the most recent programs, arising from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
differ in a number of ways related to the disasters and the program design. It
is these program design differences, however, that can be critical to the
success of the program.
30. Fazzi, supra note 4.
31. See generally id.
32. Fazzi, supra note 4; see also, Insurance Issues Mobilize the ADR Community in the Wake
of the Gulf Coast Hurricanes, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 171 (2005) [hereinafter
Insurance Issues Mobilize].
33. See AAA Brochure, supra note 18.
34. S.C. Thompson, Will It Hurt Less If I Can Control It? A Complex Answer to a Simple
Question, PsycH. BULLETIN 89-101 (1981) (discussing how people tend to experience less stress in a
situation in which they believe they have some degree of control over the threatening event).
35. See Fazzi, supra note 4.
36. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.82 (2007).
37. See FLA. ST. ANN. § 44:1011 (2007). In one year, Florida was struck by three consecutive
hurricanes in different areas of the state and resulting in 1.7 million insurance claims. See Insurance
Issues Mobilize, supra note 32. Florida permanently established Citizen Dispute Settlement Centers
to administrate these insurance claims and a wider variety of claims. Id. Similarly, the governor of
California recently signed into law a permanent earthquake and catastrophe insurance mediation
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KATRINA-RITA MEDIATION
Hurricane Katrina struck the gulf coast of Louisiana and Mississippi on
August 29, 2005, bringing with it more devastation caused by natural
disaster than has ever been experienced before in the United States. 38 Total
economic losses solely from Katrina are estimated by economists at $100-
125 billion. 39 The hurricane caused large-scale flooding that left 80% of the
city submerged. 40  Post-hurricane, less than two-thirds of its original
population has returned and many who did are on the brink of leaving.4' In
Mississippi, slabs were the only thing left where neighborhoods used to be.
A year and a half later, thousands of people still live in temporary housing
provided by the federal government.42
Less than three weeks after Katrina, Hurricane Rita struck the Gulf
Coast on the Texas-Louisiana border. Together, the two Hurricanes
decimated the entire Gulf Coast of Mississippi and Louisiana, and also
caused widespread damage in Alabama and Texas. Both Mississippi and
Louisiana, following the lead of Florida, Hawaii, California, and Minnesota
have adopted mass disaster insurance mediation programs.43
EXTERNAL FACTORS CREATING IMBALANCES IN POWER AND INCENTIVE TO
BARGAIN
Many Katrina and Rita insureds share common legal problems regarding
insurance coverage. In both states, the problem of whether homeowners'
38. Robert J. Samuelson, Hitting the Economy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005 (discussing the
economic impact of Katrina).
39. See Robert P. Hartwig, Ins. Info. Inst. Hurricane Season of 2005: Impacts on US P/C Ins.
Markets in 2006 and Beyond (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-data/binary/744130_lO/katrina.pdf.
40. Bill Walsh, Katherine Lewis, & John McQuaid, Will New Orleans Ever be the Same?
Sept. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.nola.conm/newslogs/tporleans/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola-tporleans/archives/
2005_09_01.html.
41. For extensive coverage of efforts to rebuild and repopulate New Orleans, see
www.nola.com. See also Gwen Filosa, The Lonely Lower Nine, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), Dec. 18, 2006 ("Sixteen months after Katrina, hope is as rare as people on the streets
of the Lower 9th Ward.").
42. See Editorial, Katrina's Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006.
43. See http://www.ldi.state.la.us/hurricanekatrina.htm#mediation, http://www.doi.state.ms.us/
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insurance provides coverage has already entered the litigation process. 44
Generally speaking, uncertainty surrounding the resolution of a legal issue
provides incentive to both sides to settle in mediation rather than to risk
complete loss at trial. 45  Here, however, the threat of losing in the courts
weighs heavily on the minds of many.46 Lack of movement in the courts
and legislatures on this issue also weighs heavily, although some effort is
evident on the legislative front.47
Another risk to insureds lies in their problems of proof. If they win on
the issue of coverage, they face tremendous problems of proof.48 Many
residents were not allowed to even view their homes until months after the
damage occurred, and many lost documents and other proof of ownership
and value of their property. As a result of these problems, homeowners in
both states fear minuscule compensation and face lengthy, expensive court
battles.
49
What of the insurance companies? An estimated 700,000 insurance
claims were filed along the Gulf Coast after Katrina, though not all were
property damage claims. ° Until the coverage issue is decided, the insurance
44. Mississippi's Attorney General Jim Hood filed suit less than a month after Hurricane
Katrina struck the Mississippi Gulf Coast accusing insurers of selling confusing policies that fell
short of homeowner's reasonable expectations of coverage. Hood v. Miss. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.,
No. 3:05-CV-00572-TSL-AGN (S.D. Miss. 2005). See also Jennifer Bayot, Mississippi Sues
Insurers Over Damage from Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005. Well-known plaintiff attorney
Dickie Scruggs subsequently joined the fray filing a class action lawsuit on behalf of thousands of
policy-holders. In Louisiana, several class actions have been filed and thousands of individual claims
are pending, most of which have been consolidated into the In Re Katrina Canal Breaches case
before Judge Stanwood Duval in the Eastern District Court.
45. Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation,
1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNTABLE 75 [hereinafter Gertner, Assymetric Information]; Joseph A.
Grundfest and Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006) (discussing how predictions concerning the effects of increased
uncertainty are based on the assumption that parties are risk neutral. Further, if parties are risk
averse, greater uncertainty pushes them toward settlement.); see also Douglas Yam, Evaluative
Dispute Resolution Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Look at Bayes Theorem and the Expected
Value of Perfect Information, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 427.
46. Editorial, An Unequal Battle, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 3, 2006
[hereinafter "An Unequal Battle"].
47. The Louisiana legislature considered bills to prevent insurers from denying coverage
solely based on evidence of flood damage. Legislature Takes Aims at Insurance Claim Denials, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Feb. 8, 2006. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently upheld
hurricane legislation extending to two years the time period allowed by law to file damage claims
with an insured's insurance company. State v. All Property and Insurance Carriers Authorized to do
Business in the State of Louisiana, No. 2006-CD-2030 (La. 8/25/06). Mississippi residents have
three years to file.
48. Insurance Issues Mobilize, supra note 32.
49. Insurance Issues Mobilize, supra note 32.
50. An Unequal Battle, supra note 46.
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companies facing hundreds of billions of dollars in claims and would likely
fare better in litigation.51 Thus, in weighing the cost of failing to settle and
the risk faced by insured and insurer, the insurer has less incentive to
bargain. The insured has much greater risk if the parties fail to settle
creating asymmetrical costs between the parties.52
In addition, the insurance companies have the luxuries of time and
money - if they engage in mediation now, they pay on claims for which they
may owe nothing if the litigation resolves coverage in their favor.5 3 If they
litigate, they hold on to more funds longer.54 If they lose on the coverage
issue in the litigation, they have been able to hold on to the bulk of the funds
longer and still have the opportunity to reduce the payment on a claim due to
the problems of proof though negotiations with their insured.5 5 From the
perspective of the insurance company, settling is not that attractive unless it
is for a very low price. The imbalance in incentives to negotiate creates a
significant power advantage for the insurance company in mediation. 16
Another external factor that can affect parties' behavior at the bargaining
table is each state's response to the coverage issue.57 Mississippi and
Louisiana have responded very differently. On Sept. 15, 2005, Mississippi
Attorney General Jim Hood filed suit to void property casualty insurance
policies, and invalidate provisions, that would be used to exclude Katrina-
related coverage.5" The suit awaits action in federal court, but it includes a
request for a temporary restraining order to stop insurers from asking
property owners to sign documents stating that their loss was caused by
flood or water, as opposed to wind, and to stop using water exclusions to
51. A number of newspaper articles have discussed the predicted insurance losses. See, e.g.,
Anita Lee, Wind or Water: The Debate Rages, But Who Will Pay?, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Ms.), Dec.
21, 2005; Rebecca Mowbray, Flooding Poses Insurance Puzzle, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), Sept. 10, 2005.
52. Gertner, Assymetric Information, supra note 45.
53. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970); see also CLINTON E. MILLER, THOMAS McGREAL, & DAVID
FRANGIAMORE, How INSURANCE COMPANIES SETTLE CASES (2006).
54. ROSS, supra note 53.
55. Ross, supra note 53.
56. As the litigation matures, rulings are beginning to be issued in some cases with mixed
reactions from the parties. See, e.g., Judge Rejects Claim for Katrina Flood Damage,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/ 08/15/katrina.lawsuit/index.html, posted August 15, 2006, 9:45
p.m. EDT; but see discussion infra notes 57-58.
57. See GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 6.
58. Insurance Companies Mobilize, supra note 32.
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deny or reduce coverage for hurricane damage or loss.5 9 This state action
sends a message to insurance companies that the state will support, and in
fact represent, insureds in fighting the wind/flood battle.
In Louisiana, private lawsuits pose the insurance coverage question.60
The consequences of this litigation remain unclear.61 Private litigation, to
the extent it remains scattered, is likely to produce conflicting decisions that
will be fought through the appellate courts. 62
Thus, while the two mediation programs in Louisiana and Mississippi
are structured the same, administrated the same (through AAA), and arise
from the same or similar disaster(s), they occur in different legal and
political environments. These environments have a significant effect on the
bargaining environment in which insureds find themselves during mediation
and will likely produce widely different outcomes. Moreover, neither
Louisiana or Mississippi have "cooling-off' period legislation to protect
unrepresented insureds, although the literature from both insurance
departments states that parties do have three days to rescind the agreement.63
Neither Louisiana nor Mississippi has any publicly available, free education
59. Id.
60. These cases are beginning to make their way through the court system. See In Re Katrina
Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., Nos. 05-0623, 06-516, 06-1673, and 06-1674, Kelly A. Humphries v.
Encompass Ins. Co., 05-4182, 06-0169, 2006 WL 3421012 (E.D. La. 2006) and Joseph B. Treaster,
Judge Upholds Policyholders' Katrina Flood Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006 (discussing Judge
Duval's ruling denying numerous insurers' motions for summary judgment on their flood exclusions
in their homeowner's policies); see also Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05CV559
LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 1442489 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (Judge Senter's ruling granting summary judgment
in favor of insurers on the issue of whether storm surge was an excluded peril, but denying summary
judgment on other wind/water exclusion claims). The Fifth Circuit, however, in August reversed
Judge Duval on the flood exclusion issue. Seeln Re Katrina Canal Breaches, No. 07-30119, 2007
WL 2200004 (5th Cir. 2007).
Numerous initial skirmishes in the Katrina litigation in Louisiana have been about federal
jurisdiction. Suits filed against insurers have been removed from state court to federal court on the
basis of diversity, the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Multi-Party, Multi-Forum Trial Jurisdiction
Act. The specter of losing the state forum for adjudicating these disputes is another external factor
contributing to the context. See, e.g., Southall v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2385365
(E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2006) and Berry v. Allstate, 2006 WL 2710588 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2006)
61. The litigation also poses a number of legal problems, including estoppel and res judicata,
to name two. If a court rules against the insureds in an action that has been certified as a class
action, hundreds of thousands of insureds may be exposed to claims of res judicata. If the lawyers
for hundreds of insureds fail to handle the action correctly and it is subsequently dismissed for
pleading defects or other procedural defects, the suit could be dismissed with prejudice - again
precluding relief for hundreds maybe thousands of people. A defendant class would probably be a
better approach to this problem, though this form of class action is little used and to date not
considered as a remedy by these parties.
62. Id.; see also discussion supra notes 60-61.
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programs other than department of insurance brochures to explain the
process of mediation and what to expect during the negotiations. 64
The components of power at the bargaining table are many, and they
matter in negotiations. Power, as Professor Korobkin has described it, can
be viewed "as the ability to bend the opponent to your will., 65  Korobkin
further proposes that "the basis of power is the threat that you will not give
the opponent what she wants., 66 In the present context, the insurer has all
the power, but especially that of time, experience, money, knowledge (i.e.,
education on process and issues).67 In addition, there is financial incentive
not to settle claims.
INTERNAL FACTORS: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF A CATASTROPHE
In the literature concentrated on mediation and negotiations, little
attention is given to the cognitive thought processes involved in making a
decision and impediments to that process. Consequently, even less attention
has been focused on the complex psychological impact a natural disaster can
have on the decision-making capacity of a person impacted by such an
event.
Disasters causing severe, lasting, and pervasive psychological effects
are characterized by at least two of the following: a high prevalence of
injury; threat to or actual loss of life; extreme and widespread property
damage; serious, ongoing financial problems for the affected community;
and involvement of human carelessness or intent.6 8 Perception of life threat,
64. See AAA brochures, supra note 18. Although their programs are structured to allow a
three-day cooling-off period, no legislation mandates it. Presumably, parties could be asked to
waive the three-day period, or claim it was waived, during the mediation and that issue could arise in
subsequent litigation to rescind or enforce the settlement agreement.
65. RUSSEL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY ch. 5 (2002). Morton Duetch
equates power with the ability of one party to influence another to behave according to the first
party's preferences. MORTON DUETCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND
DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES (1973). See also GULLIVER, supra note 6, positing that negotiating power
is based on the possession of resources and other external conditions.
66. KOROBKIN, supra note 65.
67. Race may also be a factor. See An Unequal Battle, supra note 46. The context will also
likely produce secondary reactions from lawyers, which in turn will influence the potential
participants attitudes and openness to trying mediation. This has happened in Missisippi, where trial
lawyer Dickie Scruggs has openly criticized the state's mediation program. See Anita Lee, Scruggs
Challenges Mediation Program, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Dec. 23, 2005. None of the lawyers
in Louisiana have openly attacked its state program.
68. Davidson & McFarlane, Extent and Impact, supra note 13.
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injuries to the individual or family members, bereavement, destruction of the
family home, loss of possessions, and associated loss of sense of identity and
social integration are risk factors for increased psychological problems,
determined in part by the degree of exposure. 69 A catastrophic event can
have a significant impact on an individual's state of mind and decision-
making capacity.70
A. Signs of Impaired Capacity
An individual who is experiencing a conflict that requires third-party
intervention is likely to experience a range of emotions that may impair his
or her capacity to make considered decisions about options. Any conflict
has the capacity to challenge one's perception of the future and his or her
perceptions of identity and place in the world.7' In most individual
conflicts, however, the party still has multiple levels of coping mechanisms
and support structures.72 In contrast, a catastrophic natural disaster, such as
a hurricane, earthquake, or tsunami, breaks the entire fabric of a community
apart. It destroys churches, businesses, houses, and infrastructure like
sewage, water, and electricity. It takes lives and wreaks widespread and
total devastation. The magnitude of such devastation brings with it the
potential for a more complex psychological response by victims in both the
long and short term. Dr. Dori Reissman notes that Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita highlighted the importance of social networks and social support to
69. Disasters have also been distinguished from other types of potentially traumatic events by
identifying the event as "massive collective stress" or "violent encounters with nature, technology, or
humankind." W. Kinston & R. Rosser, Disaster: Effect on Medical and Physical State, 18 J. OF
PSYCHOSOM. RES. 437 (1974). The common thread is the "collective social suffering that requires a
supreme effort by individuals, communities, and even entire societies to overcome." Davidson &
McFarlane, Extent and Impact, supra note 13.
70. Davidson & McFarlane, Extent and Impact, supra note 13; see also Patrick J. Bracken,
Joan Giller, & Derek Summerfield, Psychological Responses to War and Atrocity: The Limitations
of Current Concepts, 40 Soc. Sci. Med. 1073-82 (1975); Robert J. Ursano, M.D., Frederick P.
Cerise, M.D., M.P.H., Robert DeMartino, M.D., Dori B. Reissman, M.D., M.P.H., & M. Katherine
Shear, M.D., The Impact of Disasters and Their Aftermath in Mental Health, 67 J. CLIN.
PSYCHIATRY 1 (2006) [hereinafter Ursano, Cerise, et.al, The Impact of Disasters]; Michael A.
Crabbs & Edward Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, THE PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE
J. 378 (February 1991) [hereinafter Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster];
Shayna Murdoch & Tyler Childs Cymet, Treating the Victims After Disaster: Physical and
Psychological Effects, 32 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 39 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Murdoch &
Cymet, Treating the Victims].
71. See Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70; Murdoch
& Cymet, Treating the Victims, supra note 70.
72. Ursano, Cerise, et.al, The Impact of Disasters, supra note 70; Murdoch & Cymet, Treating
the Victims, supra note 70.
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communities, families and individuals.73  When victims lose their
community, more and more layers of distress are added, including the loss of
coping skills and other ways to calm down. 74
Some documented short-term responses can include recurrent and
intrusive memories of the event, reminders of the event evoking
psychological distress, avoiding thoughts of feelings associated with the
trauma, avoiding activities or situations that are reminders of the trauma,
loss of usual interests, feeling detached or estranged from others, have a
sense of a foreshortened future, insomnia, irritability or angry outbursts,
difficulty concentrating, and an exaggerated startle response. 75 Other short-
term effects include demoralization, disorientation, and loss of
connections. 76  Trauma causes survivors to feel drained of energy,
conviction, and direction; dazed and stunned, unable to locate themselves in
time and space; to feel a sense of isolation from other people; and to have
difficulty in establishing and maintaining warm relationships.77 A study of
flood survivors in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, showed residents were
capable of acts of generosity during difficult times, but found it difficult both
to relate to others as separate individuals and to mobilize the energy to
care. 78  The sudden and severe shock of a natural disaster breaks through
one's defenses with such force that many survivors cannot respond
effectively. 7 Some individuals will experience intense anxiety,
despondency, confusion, absence of emotion, inhibition of activity, docility,
indecisiveness, and lack of responsiveness, which Anthony Wallace labeled
"disaster syndrome."o
For many individuals, these symptoms gradually diminish as their lives
return to normal.81 However, when an entire community has been unraveled
73. Ursano, Cerise, et.al, The Impact of Disasters, supra note 70.
74. Crabbs & Heffon, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70.
75. Id. at 378-79.
76. Id. at 379.
77. Crabbs & Heffon, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 379.
78. Id.; see also Davidson & McFarlane, The Extent and Impact, supra note 13 (discussing
additional studies of the kinds and longevity of dysfunction following other disasters).
79. Crabbs & Heffon, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 379.
80. Anthony Wallace, Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and
Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation, Disaster Studies, No. 3, Washington, D.C.:
Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (1956).
81. Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70. From the
onset of the disaster, people try to assess the disaster and comprehend its magnitude. Most people
attempt to and make progress in establishing a mental equilibrium. Id.
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people lose structures in the community that would ordinarily serve to
mediate and help them cope with their short-term distress. 82 Other factors
such as age, health, personal loss in the event and personal trauma from the
event can also exaggerate these responses and one's evaluation of their own
capacity to process what has happened to them.83 People are forced to
relocate, often many miles from home, to live with a neighbor or relative, or
to live in government-created trailer parks where they are thrown together
with other victims in a high-stress living environment.14 Loss caused by the
calamity is often intensified by these settlement attempts, which, in turn,
often lead to interpersonal problems.
85
The long-term effects of a disaster include anxiety, fear, apathy,
depression,8 6 hysteria, anger, fantasy, and delusions.87  Many victims will
evidence disappointment, disillusionment, depression, anger, and resentment
and these feelings can be directed toward government agencies, contractors,
and other disaster-related resources that may not have fulfilled the victim's
expectations. 88  In the aftermath of a natural disaster, coverage disputes
number in the hundreds of thousands making insurance companies and even
mediators in government-sponsored programs prime targets for these
emotions. 9
Long-term effects on survivor's mental health have been explored by a
number of investigators. "Psychic numbing" is one outgrowth and
intensification of "disaster syndrome." 90 Researchers who observed flood
victims two years after the event concluded that "psychic numbing" was a
universal response to the disaster, manifesting itself with such symptoms as
82. Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 379-80.
83. Id.
84. Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 379-80.
85. Id.
86. Davidson & McFarlane suggest that the focus of PTSD has led some an underestimate of
the importance of depression as a source of psychological dysfunction, particularly in populations in
which there are major levels of loss that have an enduring effect. Demoralization in the wake of
prolonged hardships after the disaster is an important contributor to vulnerability to depression.
Davidson & McFarlane, Extent and Impact, supra note 13, at 10-11. John H. Ehrenreich discusses
the risks and benefits of using the term "post-traumatic stress disorder" broadly to apply to widely
differing events and to describe widely divergent psychological responses to these events.
Ehrenreich, Understanding PTSD: Forgetting "Trauma", 3 ANALYSES SOC. ISS. & PUB. POL'Y 15,
15-28 (2003).
87. Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 379.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also F.H.Norris, et al., Post-disaster PTSD Over Four Waves of a Panel Study of
Mexico's 1999 Flood, 17 J. OF TRAUMA. STRESS 283 (2004) (a study of the disaster victims after
Mexico's 1999 flood documenting PTSD one year later at 24% and two years later at 11%).
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memory problems, inability to concentrate, unwanted thoughts and ideas,
blank spells, and indecisiveness. 9'
The loss of social relationships is very traumatic. Loss of social ties or
support systems includes loss of a spouse, loss of children, and loss of other
relatives through death or relocation. 92  Destruction of the neighborhood,
loss of a home and prized personal possessions, combined with family
members and friends, may so shock survivors that they withdraw and make
few attempts to establish new relationships or rekindle old ones. 93  Social
support is such an important buffer that without it communities and
individuals may experience increases in robbery, juvenile delinquency, and
consumption of drugs and alcohol. 94 Financial problems, feelings of being
cheated by others, unemployment, and the hard physical work required
rebuilding - all have an impact on interpersonal relationships. 95
For the mediation context, these complex psychological responses create
a situation in which multiple stressors at varying levels of occurrence and
intensity may impact individuals who are targeted for participation in mass
mediation programs.
96
B. Cognition and Decision Making Capacity
These multiple stressors on the psyche are linked to cognition and
capacity for decision making. Cognitive effects of stress are significant and
include narrowing of attention or perceptual tunneling, 97 reduced working
memory, 98 and rigidity. 99 For complex tasks, this narrowing can result in





96. Psychiatrists have confirmed that the rates of mental health problems in the New Orleans
area are staggering and resources to help are critically low. Sharon Schmickle, Mental Health
Problems Abound a Year After Katrina, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Aug. 19, 2006. One victim
said, "I've got a hurting thing... 1 lost more than I can handle. It's like someone cut off your arm.
You keep looking for it, and you can't find it." Id.
97. J.A. Easterbrook, The Effect of Emotion on Cue Utilization and the Organization of
Behavior, 66 PSYCHOL. REV. 183-201 (1959); Christopher D. Wickens, Designing for Stress, in
STRESS AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE, 279-95 (Driskell & Salas eds. ,1996).
98. WORKLOAD TRANSITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND TEAM PERFORMANCE
(B.M. Huey & C.D. Wickens eds., 1993).
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the elimination of relevant task information and task performance can
suffer.1 00 In addition to the reduction of working memory, stress can restrict
information retrieved from long-term memory to that which is most
dominant or well-learned.' 0'
One notable stressor that also impacts decision-making capacity is time
pressure, which is significant in the context of mass mediation programs
since the mediations are usually designed to last approximately two hours.'02
Research suggests that time pressure degrades performance because of the
demands of information overload and the need to process information in a
limited amount of time. 103  One of the strategies an individual may adopt
under time pressure is to filter information that needs to be processed and
another is to consider all alternatives based on a single criterion rather than
considering each alternative sequentially. 104 As a consequence of these
coping mechanisms, research indicates that decision-making accuracy
declines. 105
99. See R.M. Staw, L.E. Sandelands & J.E. Dutton, Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational
Behavior: A Multi-Level Analysis, 26 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 501 (1981). Rigidity results in an individual
clinging to a set method of problem-solving even when it ceases to provide a direct task solution. Id.
100. James E. Drikell, Eduardo Salas, & Joan H. Johnston, Decision Making and Performance
Under Stress, in MILITARY PERFORMANCE (Thomas W. Britt, Amy B. Adler & Carl A. Castro eds.,
2005). See also David M. Warburton, Stress and the Processing of Information, in HUMAN STRESS
AND COGNITION: AN INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH 469-75 (David M. Warburton &
Vernon Hamilton eds., 1979); George Mandler, Thought Processes, Consciousness and Stress, in
HUMAN STRESS AND COGNITION: AN INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH, supra, at 179-201;
PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF COMPETENCE IN DECISION MAKING (Kip Smith et al. eds.,
2004).
101. See M.W. EYSENCK, A HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (1984); E.L. Cohen, The
Influence of Varying Degrees of Psychological Stress on Problem-Solving Rigidity, 47 J. OF
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 512-19 (1952).
102. Psychologists have begun to study the impact of various stressors in the context of
mediated and non-mediated negotiations. See, e.g., Peter J. Carnevale et al., Time Pressure in
Negotiation and Mediation, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 117-27 (Ola Svenson, et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Time Pressure in Negotiation and
Mediation]; Eric J. Johnson et al., Adapting to Time Constraints, in TIME PRESSURE & STRESS IN
HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra, at 103-16; Jeryl L. Mumpower, The Judgment
Policies of Negotiators and the Structure of Negotiation Problems, in JUDGMENT & DECISION
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER, 423-41 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2000); Max H.
Bazerman et al., The Effect of Agents and Mediators on Negotiation Outcomes, in JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING, supra, at 442-59.
103. P. Wright, The Harassed Decision-Maker: Time Pressures, Distractions, and the Use of
Evidence, 44 J. OF MARKETING RES. 429-43 (1974); see also Time Pressure in Negotiation and
Mediation, supra note 102.
104. See Wright, supra note 103; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
105. See I.L. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977), (presenting a model of decision-making in which
they distinguished between "vigilant and hypervigilant decision-making"). Hypervigilant decision-
making is characterized by selective information search, consideration of limited alternatives, rapid
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More specifically, time pressure in negotiations and in the mediation
context has been documented to result in lower demands, faster concessions,
and faster agreements, generally reducing the level of outcome negotiators
wanted to achieve.106 Barnes' and Komarita's 1969 study demonstrated that
when both parties have equal pressure to reach agreement and experience
high costs by continuing the negotiations, concession making was greater
and the number of trials to reach agreement were fewer. 0 7 In contrast, when
pressure is asymmetric, i.e., when one party bears a higher cost if
negotiations fail, the party with the greater costs made more concessions and
settled for a lower outcome that the party without the costs. 0 8 No similar
studies have been performed on the participants of mass mediation
programs, but it is clear that the policy-holder in a property insurance
mediation bears the greatest costs of failing to reach an agreements.' 09 The
typical policyholder will need the funds to rebuild or relocate. In contrast,
the insurance company saves money by not reaching agreement.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEM DESIGNERS & MEDIATORS
Because both individual and collective trauma can have an impact on
decision-making capacity and cognition, mass mediation system designers
need to take these psychological factors into account when creating a
evaluation of data, and selection of a solution without extensive review or reappraisal. It is viewed as
an impulsive, disorganized process generally resulting in poor quality judgments. Id. See also
HUMAN STRESS AND COGNITION: AN INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH, supra note 100;
KENNETH R. HAMMOND, JUDGMENTS UNDER STRESS (2000); and JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982).
106. See D. Brookmire & F. Sistrunk, The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of
Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation, 24 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 311 (1980); S, Komarita &
M. Barnes, Effects of Pressures to Reach Agreement in Bargaining, 13 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 245 (1969) [hereinafter Komarita & Barnes, Effects of Pressures to Reach Agreement]; D.
G. Pruitt and J. L. Drews, The Effect of Time Pressure, Time Elapsed, and the Opponent's
Concession Rate on Behavior in Negotiation, 5 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 43 (1969).
107. The notion that time pressure influences concessions has become an elementary concept in
negotiation strategy. See, e.g., D. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 30-31 (1981); Gary Goodpaster,
A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325, 361-62; Charles B. Craver,
Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement, C586 ALI-ABA I (1990).
108. Komarita & Barnes, Effects of Pressures to Reach Agreement, supra note 106; see also
Gertner, Asymmetric Information, supra note 45.
109. One mediator from Florida has acknowledged these potential asymmetries between the
parties in reflection on his own participation in mass insurance mediation. See Mel Rubin, Disaster
Mediation: Lessons in Conflict Coordination, 2006 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 17.
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process in which these victims are invited to participate. The system must
be designed with more than a focus on resolving a large number of claims
quickly. A fair process must also be designed for competent decision-
making."10  Designing for competence, then, requires envisioning an
environment of optimal performance, taking into consideration the user
population, the external environment, the tasks and procedures involved. "'
All of these factors must be designed to support both communication
competence and cognitive competence. 112
The impetus for mass insurance mediation programs has been the sheer
and overwhelming numbers of claims that arise after events causing wide-
spread property damage. Designing with an end-goal of providing
alternatives to litigation and a process by which people can participate and
control outcomes while also clearing larger numbers of claims quickly is a
good end goal. But if this is the only consideration, important aspects of the
process design will be overlooked and one of the outcomes will be a process
that is inherently unfair to the victims of the disaster.
Andrew Scherer, a lawyer with Legal Services of New York, has
identified a "five-part test for equitable process" in ADR system design:113
(1) Representation Equity. Do both sides have balanced representation? A significant
factor here is the relative experience of the parties in the mediation process. Both parties
may be unrepresented giving the appearance of representational equity, when in fact the
disparity of experience with the process or the substance of the dispute can create a
representation gap.
(2) Knowledge Equity. Are all participants, including the mediator, balanced with regard
to their knowledge of the process and the subject of the dispute, and the law?
(3) Language Equity. In increasing numbers, people do not have adequate skills in
spoken or written English to understand what occurs in a mediation session. This gap in
understanding may also include cultural and other culturally-related cofnitive gaps that
prevent a party from even understanding the other party's point of view.
110. Patricia M. Jones, Designing for Competence, in PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF
COMPETENCE IN DECISION MAKING, 149-60 (Kip Smith et al. eds., 2004).
111. See Jones, supra note 110, at 152. Jones contrasts competence-driven design with design
philosophies that are technology-driven, theory-driven, or user-centered. Id.
112. Id. Both communication competence and cognitive competence overlap. Jones states,
"[c]ognitive competence implies the study of expertise, the development of rules and knowledge."
Id. at 151. Communication competence adopts a cooperative principled approach to language shared
by participants who orient themselves to each other and rely on these principles as aids in inferences.
Id. at 151-52.
113. Fern Schair, Chair, Ferick Center for Social Justice and Dispute Resolution, Fern A.
Fischer, New York Supreme Court Justice, Beth Schwartz, Professor, Fordham University School of
Law & Andrew Scherer, Executive Director, Legal Services for New York City, remarks from a
panel discussion at the Fordham University Symposium: Using ADR for Achieving Social Justice:
Can the Promise of ADR Deliver Justice to Those in Need? (Oct. 13, 2006) (published with
permission of Andrew Scherer).
114. This category could encompass additional cultural factors.
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(4) Social Power Equity. Power relationships between parties is a factor that process
designers must consider. Unevenly distributed social power between the parties at the
table will lead to results that may not truly be consensual.
(5) Political Equity. Fueled by powerful economic incentive and will, some groups have
large and powerful lobbyists who can go to Congress and to state elected officials,
whereas a single individual typically has no such political power. The relative political
power of the parties, therefore, is another consideration if a process designer is concerned115
with developing a balanced, fair process.
A competence-driven design, then, is not exclusively user-driven. 116 It
is concerned with context and can have multiple end goals and relevant
outcomes. 7  One of these end goals should be to constructively contribute
to the recovery process in the larger community and at the individual user
level." 8 After a catastrophic event, individuals already will be coping with
multiple situations in which they may feel victimized. If they leave the
mediation feeling like the mediation process victimized them further, then
the process design has failed to contribute to recovery and failed the
individual user. 119
115. As with many fundamental issues relative to the duties and responsibilities of mediators,
there is no uniform agreement that the mediator has a duty to ensure a fair agreement is reached. See
Robert A. Baruch-Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The
Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989). Baruch-Bush has
opined that there is an element of paternalism inconsistent with the principle of free choice
underlying the value of consent whenever a mediator intervenes to "protect" one party from coercion
by another. Baruch-Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice, supra note 7, at 18. Joseph L.
Stulberg argues the mediator should not have the responsibility for policing fairness. Joseph L.
Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85
(1981). Some concepts of mediation, however, suggest that the mediator owes a duty to protect the
parties' interests and to gauge fairness of the outcome to each of the parties. See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary
Conception of Lawyers Responsibilities, 38 TEX. L. REv. 407 (1997).
116. Jones, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. I suggest this as an end goal because I assume there should be reasons for establishing the
program in the first place and those reasons should provide benefits to both parties who participate:
insurer and insured. If the program inherently favors one or the other party, it will not be neutral,
will be likely to invite criticism from attorneys on one side or the other, and will ultimately
discourage many from participating.
119. My conclusion here is based in part on the assumption that a state-sponsored mass
mediation program is established at least in part with the goal of providing people with a quicker
more efficient path toward settling insurance disputes than traditional litigation, thereby allowing
them to get on with re-establishing their lives. It would seem that victimizing people further would
be inimical to that goal. Traditional litigation does not provide efficient or quick solutions, but rather
has a focus on achieving justice through a lengthy process with greater procedural protections and
rights to appeal, which can act as barriers to victimization of participants. Moreover, traditional
419
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATORS
The complex state of mind of an individual participant also has
immediate ground-floor implications for mediations. Mediators need to: (1)
be able to recognize when a participant's cognitive faculties are
compromised by trauma; (2) know the consequences of impeded judgment;
and (3) have considered options for handling the situation, which will better
prepare them to face situations when they arise.
Being able to recognize when an individual's capacity to make decisions
is compromised is not necessarily an easy task and may require special
training in the context of mass mediation programs that follow a catastrophe.
120 The consequences of impeded judgment are significant. From a
contractual standpoint, duress is a recognized vice of consent in contract
law. Thus, an agreement reached when and individual is experiencing
extreme duress can be vitiated for lack of consent.' 2 ' If thousands of
litigation has no particular end goal other than providing parties with a neutral, procedurally fair
forum to resolve differences.
It is the informality of mediation that can potentially be problematic. Examples of informality in
dispute resolution working to the advantage of the more powerful can be found in the juvenile justice
system, divorce situations, housing disputes, and historically in the employer-employee relationship.
See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS 127 (1983); RICHARD L. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1982); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 446 (1992) (arguing that mediator intervention does not protect the
less empowered wife from disadvantageous outcomes). Professor Mnookin recognizes that unequal
bargaining power between spouses justifies some limitations on private ordering in the divorce
context. Robert Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. L.J.
REF. 1015, 1024-31 (1985).
120. See Baruch-Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice, supra note 7, at 10 (observing that
one skill many mediators are not trained in is recognizing certain situations or conditions that may
negate the consensual assumptions on which mediation is conducted).
121. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts §176 (1999) (discussing the elements of duress). Ordinarily,
duress cannot be a creature of one's own mind. King v. Lewis, 4 S.E. 2d 464 (1939). However,
more recent courts have recognized a form of "circumstantial duress." In one case involving pre-
death releases of survival and death claims, a court observed that family members "may feel extreme
emotional pressure" and "the ability of those involved to intelligently and rationally execute a release
of their future rights under such circumstances is far from ideal." Daigle v. Clemco Indus., 593
So.2d 1282 (La. App. 1' Cir. 1991); see also Standard Coffee Serv. Co. v. Elliot Constr. Co., 363
So.2d 671 (La. 1978) (rescinding an agreement for circumstantial duress).
However, note that domains of legal competence, the capacity to make autonomous decisions, and
the ability to provide informed consent are closely related but distinct from each other. P. S.
APPELBAUM AND J. W. BERG, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2nd
ed. 2001). Legally a person is determined competent or incompetent, whereas in psychological
assessment decision-making capacity varies along a continuum from incapacitated to fully
capacitated. Donald Rosenstein, Decision-Making Capacity and Disaster Research, 17 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 373-81 (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Rosenstein, Decision-Making Capacity and
Disaster Research].
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individuals are vulnerable to the distress wrought by catastrophe, then their
agreements are potentially vulnerable to attack based on duress or
unconscionability. 122 If one of the end-goals is to provide a more efficient
process through which individuals can participate and own their outcomes
and avoid protracted litigation, then the creation of thousands of agreements
that are vulnerable to attack would seem to conflict with that goal.
Mediators need to be trained to recognize the signs of impeded judgment so
that they can consider their immediate options.
One of those options is to allow ventilation. 123  People need to
ventilate. 124 To deal effectively with a crisis, an individual must first accept
the reality of the situation. 25 Victims may need help assessing and handling
the reality of the present situation, as well as the long term effects. 126 In the
mediation setting, they may need the opportunity and encouragement to talk
about their losses and ventilate their inner thoughts and feelings, either in
caucus or directly to the insurer's representative at the mediation. Mediators
who participate in mass mediation programs following a catastrophic event
should receive some additional training on empathetic listening and the
importance of allowing a party to ventilate. However, most lawyer-
mediators are not psychologists and may not be equipped to deal with an
individual whose "venting" deteriorates into an unstable, unproductive
mental state or who is directing all anger and frustration arising from the
totality of the situation at whoever is in the room. 1
27
122. See Wolf v. La. State Racing Comm'n, 545 So.2d 976 (La. 1989), where the Louisiana
Supreme Court rescinded a disputed agreement not on grounds of circumstantial duress, but on
grounds that the defendant's improper threats and superior bargaining position had coerced plaintiffs
consent; Larry A. DiMatteo, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in
Action, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1067 (2006) (studying cases alleging unconscionability as a basis to
rescind agreements); and Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden Limitations of
Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 627 (2006).
123. Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Association With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 381.
124. Id. This concept has been addressed in the general mediation context. See KEN CLOKE &
JOAN GOLDSMITH, RESOLVING PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT: STORIES OF
TRANSFORMATION AND FORGIVENESS (2000); JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE
MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2001); Steven L. Schwartz, The
Mediated Settlement: Is It Always Just About the Money? Rarely!, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 309
(2004); Toran Hansen, The Narrative Approach to Mediation, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 297 (2004).
125. Crabbs & Heffron, Loss Associated With a Natural Disaster, supra note 70, at 378-79.
126. This is, arguably, outside the role of a mediator. And yet, the mediator may be faced with
this situation. This prospect merely highlights the need for additional training with regard to
handling such a situation.
127. Rosenstein acknowledges that even in psychological research, little practical guidance is
offered with respect to the kinds of safeguards that can be employed to protect decisionally-impaired
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One of the most likely and most problematic dilemmas a mediator will
face is that a person whose judgment is impeded may come to rely more
heavily on the judgment and advice of the mediator.128  An individual who
has experienced catastrophic loss and then faced additional ongoing tragedy
and loss in the months subsequent to the disaster may not trust their own
judgment or may be suffering from "psychic numbing", causing the party to
seek and to rely more heavily on advice of the mediator. 129  This will
potentially place the mediator in a very awkward position that could
compromise the mediator's neutrality or, at a minimum, compromise the
parties' perceptions of the mediator's neutrality. 30 It also could expose the
mediator to subsequent litigation if the participant misconstrues the
mediator's role or relies heavily on what he or she perceives to be the
"advice" of the mediator.' 3
Mediators need to be especially cognizant of how the participant views
the mediator's role and how much the participant is seeking advice on what
to do from the mediator. One option a mediator should have is to
individuals in the context of participating in research studies. Rosenstein, Decision-Making
Capacity and Disaster Research, supra note 121. The same issue arises in the context of mediation
programs. Regulations apply to federally-funded research which attempt to protect vulnerable
subjects from exploitation for the sake of scientific progress. Id. at 375. No such limits have ever
been discussed or examined in the context of mass mediation programs even though research
confirms poor cognitive performance in the wake of disaster.
128. Marjorie Corman Aaron acknowledges that evaluation poses the risk of appearance that
the mediator is allied with the "winning" side. Aaaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in DWIGHT
GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES (1996).
129. Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Olson, The Human Meaning of Total Disaster: The Buffalo
Creek Disaster, 39 PSYCHIATRY 1- 18 (1976).
130. Mediators vary greatly in how actively they are willing to intervene in a dispute. See
MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES § 1 .1.1, at 17 (Dwight Golan ed., 1996). The debate over whether a
mediator should evaluate or only facilitate is a raging one. Professor Stark has commented that the
most difficult ethical issues in mediation are caused by the tendency of mediators to give parties
"stunted" legal advice about the weaknesses and not the strengths of a case, but Start also observes
that the principal purpose of evaluation in mediation is promoting the parties self-determination
through informed consent. James Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome
Questions and Tentative Proposals, From an Evaluative Lawyer-Mediator, 38 TEX. L. REv. 769,
771-72 (1997) [hereinafter Stark, The Ethics of Mediation].
131. Professor Stark has opined that "what passes for 'information' in mediation is often just
inexplicit 'advice' and distinguishing between the two in the midst of a heated, fast-moving
mediation is problematic." Stark, The Ethics of Mediation, supra note 130, at 784, n.35. Though it
is difficult to sue mediators for mediation conduct, it is not impossible and new theories are being
tested all the time. See Authur Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties, 53
CINN. L. REV. 731 (1984); and Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U.L. REV. 147, 170, n.83
(2003) (a mediator who evaluates almost certainly increases exposure to malpractice liability
because the process of evaluation almost certainly falls within the parameters of the practice of law).
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recommend rescheduling the mediation. An option the party should have is
to attend at the rescheduled time with an advocate who can actively assist
the individual at no-cost. Any individual can hire a lawyer and some states
allow "public adjusters" to assist parties in negotiating their insurance claims
during mediation. Because of the context in which mass mediation arises, I
am advocating designing a program that provides advocacy assistance at no
cost. Advocacy assistance has not been an element of any of the previously
designed mass insurance mediation programs. Law Schools, a state office
for dispute resolution, or non-profit organizations are valuable resources to
include in the designing stage to deal with this deficiency. 1
32
CONCLUSION
Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that a catastrophe of massive
proportions rips the threads of society apart. It pushes people to the
furthermost ends of their cognitive capacity and has both short- and long-
term effects on a victim's ability to make decisions. Research on judgments
under stress is useful in evaluating the impact of such an event on one's
cognitive capacity and has implications for both system designers and
mediators. System designers, in particular, need to consider their end goals
and design for competence. This will include processes that ensure fairness
to the parties and provide balance of power at the negotiating table. System
designers need to consider providing specialized training for mediators and
providing training and advocacy assistance for victims of the catastrophe.
These participants need to be better educated in the process of mediation
before they arrive for the actual mediation and also need to be aware of their
own potential for impeded judgment under the stress of the situation. 133
Law schools are a potential resource in this capacity. Law students
could gain useful experience in client relations and negotiations, while at the
same time assisting an individual as a personal advocate. The schools also
can provide neutral territory where mediators and participants in mediation
can receive training prior to entering the room. None of the mass mediation
programs to date have incorporated this resource in the system design.
132. These services could be funded with recovery grants.
133. See Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive
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There has been little, if any, critical post-mortem examination of these
mass disaster mediation programs. They uniformly appear to have positive
results in that they settle a great number of claims. Settling great numbers of
claims, however, is not the only measure of success. Party satisfaction is
also a measure of success. Self-determination is at the heart of the process
as well. Contributing to recovery in the larger sense and at the individual
level is a valid and significant goal.
No studies have been published studying how the participants in mass
insurance mediation programs feel about their agreements one or two years
down the line. Nevertheless, these programs do show great promise and
perhaps vision for the future. The potential for imbalance of power is a
problem, but there may be some solutions to guard against it. Educating
insureds is one solution. Toward that end, bar associations and law schools
in could form cooperative programs to provide: (1) free seminars to educate
insureds before they go to the bargaining table; (2) early claims evaluation
regarding the suitability of the case for mediation; and (3) free representation
and/or assistance at the bargaining table. Some of the factors contributing to
one's ability to exercise self-determination we cannot change. But educating
people before they engage in mediation and helping them as they participate
in the mediation itself are also likely to create a better climate for mediation
and to produce a higher rate of settlement with greater party satisfaction.
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